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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-JUDICIAL
REVIEW, STATE SECRETS, AND THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The refusal of government agencies to abide by the spirit of
existing public disclosure requirements and their continued use of the
letter of those requirements as a "shield of secrecy,"' led Congress to
enact the hopefully remedial Freedom of Information Act. 2 The Act
attempts to provide "the necessary machinery to assure the availability
of government information necessary to an informed electorate. ' 3
Although efforts to water down the literal meaning of the legislation
began even before its enactment, 4 the Act does eliminate requirements
which federal agencies have consistently relied on to withhold
information unnecessarily. The Act removes the requirement that the
requesting party show good cause for production.' The Act further
provides that upon the denial of any agency to produce the information
requested, the requesting party may file suit in federal district court to
challenge the denial. Such court proceeding is to be de novo,0 in order
that "the court can consider the propriety of withholding instead of
being restricted to judicial sanctioning of agency discretion.", The Act
also states that the agency has the burden of proving that withholding
information is justified, 8 and it limits withholding to nine specifically
stated exemptions to a general rule of production.' The first of these
exemptions, and the one with which this comment is concerned
provides that all material "specifically required by Executive order to
* Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
1. H. R. REP. No. 1497, 89TH CONG., 2D SEss. 12 (1966) (hereinafter cited as
House Report).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, (Supp. V, 1970).
3. House Report, at 12.
4. Davis, The Information Act, A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Ctu. L. REv. 761,

763 (1967).
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (3) (Supp. V, 1970) provides: "[Elach agency.
the records promptly available to any person."
6.
7.
8.
9.

.

. shall make

5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (3) (Supp. V, 1970).
House Report, at 9.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (3) (Supp. V, 1970).
U.S.C. § 552 (b) (I)-(9) (Supp. V, 1970).
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be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy ' "'

need not be disclosed.
II.
A.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

Background

The Supreme Court of the United States recognized, in the
landmark case of United States v. Reynolds," that the common law

privilege of the executive branch of government to withhold whatever
information it deemed absolutely necessary, existed at least as early in

our history as the Burr trial.' 2 It is reported that Thomas Jefferson was
the first member of that branch to attempt to extend that privilege to

all executive documents, regardless of sensitivity.' 3 Thus the privilege,
and the tendency to abuse it, have existed for more than one hundred
and fifty years.' In any event, the Reynolds case stands for the general

proposition that a compromise between executive privilege and the
public right to know, is necessary and that the judiciary is the proper
organ to determine what that compromise will be.' 5
B.

A Modern View

In 1967, Julius Epstein, a research associate at Stanford
University's Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace,

petitioned the Department of the Army for declassification and
production of an Army file entitled "Forcible Repatriation of

Displaced Soviet Citizens -Operation Keelhaul."' 6 The file, which
contains documents of both United States and British origin,
10. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (1)(Supp. V, 1970).
II. 345 U.S. 1, 9 (1953); See also Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,
199 F. 353 (D. Pa. 1912).
12. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (No. 14694) (D.C. Va. 1807).
13. J. WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 67 (Rev. ed. 1964).
14. Id.
15. 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953); See also Snyder v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.N.Y.
1956); Royal Exchange Assur. v. McGrath, 13 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y.1952); Cresmer v.
United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949); Wunderly v. United States, 8 F.R.D. 356
(E.D. Pa. 1948); Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (E.D.N.Y.
1943). The English rule is the opposite, i.e. that executive determination by the head of a
department that information must be withheld is conclusive. Duncan v. Cammell Laird
and Co. [1941] AC 624.
16. The matter of forced repatriation of Soviet citizens subsequent to World War 11
has received congressional attention in the past. 105 CONG. REc. 61 (1959).
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originated in the World War I I Allied Forces Headquarters, which had
classified it top secret. After the war, the Army stored the file as an
historical document and continued to classify it top secret under the
authority of Executive Order 1050 1.' Classification of the file had been
reviewed and retained by the Army in 1954. Upon appellant's petition,
the classification was again reviewed and again retained. In February
1968, appellant made a second request for declassification and was
advised that the file was being currently reviewed on a paper-by-paper
basis. In March 1968, appellant brought suit in United States District
Court under authority of the Freedom of Information Act, to enjoin
the Secretary of the Army, appellee, from continued withholding of the
file.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted summary judgment in favor of the government.' 8
The court held that the de novo jurisdiction granted by the act did not
apply to information which fell within one of the exemptions, so that, in
this case, judicial review of agency classification did not extend to the
circumstances of exemption, but only to whether the classification was
arbitrary or capricious. 9 The court based its holding on the language of
title 5 of the United States Code, section 552 (b), which provides that
"[t]his section does not apply to matters that are-(l) specifically
required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the
national defense or foreign policy; . . . ." This meant that the judicial
review granted in title 5 of the United States Code, section 552 (a) (3)
existed only as to information not exempted.2" The court concluded that
the government proved that the classification under Executive Order
17. 2, 3 C.F.R. 280 (1970). This Order, entitled SAFEGUARDING OFFICIAL
STATES, provides
generally that information affecting national defense may be classified TOP SECRET,
SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL and sets out instructions as to the classification,
storage, and dissemination of such information. The authorization for TOP SECRET
classification in 2,3 C.F.R. 280 (1970) is as follows:
(a) Top Secret. . . The Top Secret classification shall be applied only to
that information or material the defense aspect of which is paramount, and
the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in exceptionally grave
damage to the Nation such as affecting the defense of the United States, an
armed attack against the United States or its allies, a war, or the
compromise of military or defense plans, or intelligence operations, or
scientific or technological developments vital to the national defense.
18. Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
19. Id., at 217.
20. Id.
INFORMATION IN THE INTERESTS OF THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED
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10501 was not arbitrary or capricious by virtue of an affidavit filed by
the Adjutant General. 2
On appeal, in which the American Civil Liberties Union of
Northern California appeared amicus curiae for appellant, the United

States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, three judges sitting, affirmed
the judgment of the district court, while somewhat correcting the
holding. 22 The first argument taken up in the opinion was the

government's contention that de novo judicial review, with the burden
of proof on the agency, did not extend to the circumstances under
which an agency claimed an exemption.2 3The court began discussion of
the issue by finding the Act to be awkwardly phrased.2 4 After finding
that the legislative purpose was to make as much information as
possible available to the public, the court held that the broad judicial
review granted by the act did extend to the question of "whether the
conditions of exemption in truth exist." Indeed, it appears that no
court, other than the district court in this case, has held that the grant
of judicial review did not so extend or has even mentioned the
government's argument. Most courts interpreting the Act have either
21. The affidavit, dated May 29, 1968, is set out in Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930,
932 (9th Cir. 1970) as follows:
This review of individual papers has been completed with the Department
of the Army and coordination is now in progress with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Department of State to verify the position of the United
States Government with respect to each paper. The outcome of this effort
will determine the possibility of requesting a review and redetermination of
the classification of some or all of the documents by the British
Government. This Department will continue on its present course of
coordinating the declassification of the files with the concerned agencies.
The complexity of interests in these files indicates considerable time will
pass before a final determination is made. In the meantime, the documents
remain classified Top Secret...
22. 421 F.2d at 933.
23. Id. at 932.
24. Id., see also. Davis, The Information Act, supra note 4, at 761. Also, not only is
the Act awkwardly drawn, but the legislative history is little help in interpretation since
not only do the committee reports conflict with the literal meaning of the words of the
Act, but also conflict with each other. Compare House Report with S. REP. No. 813,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); See Davis, supra at 763.
25. 421 F.2d at 933. The court cited as authority for this holding the case of
American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696,701 (D.C. Cir. 1969) which held, inter
alia, that "judicial review would be available for a violation of any part of the Act, not
merely for subsection (3)".
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ruled as did the circuit court in Epstein v. Resor or assumed the same
26
result by implication.
The thrust of appellant's arguments was focused on the next
question taken up by the court. Appellant argued that since the broad
grant of judicial review was applicable, the district court should have
ordered the Army to turn the file over to the court for the purpose of an
in camera review to decide whether, after twenty-four years, further
withholding was justified. The court in Epstein refused to extend
judicial review under the Act to that extent "at least in this case. -,1The
court found that although judicial review extends to the underlying
factual contention in cases arising under other exemptions in the Act, it
does not extend to title 5 of the United States Code, section 552 (b) (1)
because that exemption, by its own words, specifically assigns the
decision concerning secrecy to the executive branch. The courts are
limited "to the question whether an appropriate executive order has
been made as to the material in question."" As additional authority,
the court refers to the concept developed in Chicago and Southern
Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.2 and United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp.,"'which states that questions involving national
interest and foreign policy are peculiarly appropriate for executive
consideration and inappropriate for judicial consideration.
Thereupon the Epstein court made two findings. First, the court
found that the executive order was appropriate, noting (1) the present
classification was not solely based on an initial classification which had
outlived its necessity, (2) the Army was not hiding material by giving it
a top secret classification merely because it related for filing purposes
to material properly classified top secret, and (3) there was no
"footdragging passing of responsibility" by the Army to other
26. See Grumman Aircraft Engineer Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 582
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Bristol-Myers Co. v. F.T.C., 424 F.2d 935, 938-40 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Acherley v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1969); General Services Administration
v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969); American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411
F.2d 696, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., 288 F.
Supp. 708, 711 (E.D. Pa. 1968); But see H. R. REp. No. 1497, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 2426
(1966). See generally, Polymers, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 414 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1969);
Tuchinsky v. Selective Service System of the United States, 294 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
27. 421 F.2d at 933 (emphasis added).
28. Id.

29. 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
30. 299 U.S. 304, 320-322 (1936).
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agencies or countries. 3 Secondly, the court accepted the lower court's
ruling that courts had authority to determine whether the classification
was arbitrary or capricious, and went on to find that it was not. The
court reasoned that the origin of the file alone rebutted such a
conclusion as to the original classification and, further, that although
many years had passed since that classification, the government had
32
shown cogent reasons for retaining it.
III.

A

REASONABLE COMPROMISE

The questions involved in this area of the law arise infrequently, at
best, as the paucity of cases testifies. When they do, however, two
broad and well-entrenched rules meet head on. One rule is that the
executive branch of government must be able to decide what
information is to be withheld from the public, including the courts, in
the nation's best interests." The other rule is that the courts must reexamine such executive decisions, and do so in such a manner that its
access to evidence in a case is not "abdicated to the caprice of executive
officers."' When the facts of any case irresistibly suggest that one rule
must prevail over the other, resolution is comparatively easy. An
example of this would be military defense plans recently promulgated
by NATO and classified top secret by that agency. Clearly, little fault
could be found with an executive decision to withhold these from the
public and the courts. Just as clearly, little reason could be put forward
for classifying a file containing figures on troop strength during World
War II, when such information is commonly available. The problem
arises when the facts, such as those in Epstein, do not irresistibly
suggest one rule or the other. A compromise must be reached, and it is
submitted that there are at least three questions which a court must
answer in order to reach a just compromise.3
The first question is whether the facts of the case indicate that the
31. 421 F.2d at 933.
32. Id.

33. 345 U.S. 1 (1953); United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Wash.
1944); Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912).
34. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953); See Halpern v. United States,
258 F.2d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 1958); Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255 (W.D. La. 1950);
United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. La. 1949), affd
by equally divided Court, 339 U.S. 940 (1950); See also, cases cited in note 15, supra.
35. The initial question prior to United States v. Reynolds was whether executive
classification as to state secrets was a justiciable question. That case held that it was.
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executive decision to withhold is appropriate. This question, like most
in the area of state secrets, lends itself to vague judicial reasoning. The
Epstein court, however, chose to formulate specific findings (as to
outdated classification, the type of filing system used, 3 and passing of
responsibility) which led to its deciding the question in favor of the
government. The necessary implication from such a choice is that if the
Army had not satisfied the court as to the propriety of its actions in
these three areas, the decision in the case would probably have been
different.
The second question is whether the court can order the material to
be produced for in camera inspection by the judges alone. If the
documents requested are merely "official" information, a court may
order in camera review. 37 If the documents are alleged to contain state
secrets, in camera review may38 or may not 39 be ordered, there being no
fixed rule. However, the Supreme Court in Reynolds outlined the
analysis required in each decision involving state secrets; a court should
not require in camera review if the government is able:
to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that
there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
expose military matters40which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged.

The court refused to follow the lower court's holding that in camera
review was required by the applicable rules of evidence." Both the
district court and the circuit court in the Epstein cases seem to have
followed the Reynolds analysis, although no specific mention of the
36. As to manipulation of filing systems by government agencies in order to
withhold information, see Nader, Freedomfrom Information: The Act and The Agencies
5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS L. REv. 1,9 (1970).
37. See United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, etc., 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal.
1953); United States v. Cotten Valley Operators Comm., 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. La. 1949),
affd by equally divided Court, 339 U.S. 940 (1950); 8 WIGMORE, EViDENCE §2379
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
38. See generally cases cited in n. 34, supra.
39. See generally cases cited in n. 33, supra.
40. 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
41. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987,997 (3d Cir. 195 1); Judge Maris, in his
opinion, cited 8 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE p. 799 (3d Ed. 1940) as authority. However the
discussion there does not mention state secrets; See 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2379
(McNaughton Rev. 1961) (in camera review may not be available as to state secrets);
Justices Black, Jackson, and Frankfurter dissented for substantially the same reasons as
contained in the opinion of Judge Maris.
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case is made in either opinion. Although the circuit court in Epstein did
not require in camera review, two qualifications must be noted. The
first is that this was not a last-ditch stand by Epstein since the court
had received government assurance that a paper-by-paper review was in
process and that it would request British acquiescence in the event of a
decision to declassify. Secondly, the court stated such review "in this
narrow area ' 4 2 was not necessary in this case. The court thus
acknowledged the possibility of future cases involving state secrets
where such a review would be appropriate.
The third question is whether the court is required under the Act to
order the production of information it finds to be outside of the stated
exemptions. The Epstein court did not reach this question. It would
seem there could be no answer other than that the court is so required,
by reason of the plain words of the statute. 43 At least one court,
however, has held that the statute grants power to enjoin,4" which
means equity jurisdiction, and, therefore, judicial discretion may be
exercised to refuse to order production even when the withholding is not
justified under any of the exemptions.45 Whether the power of granting
injunctions implies power to use discretion depends on statutory
construction and legislative intent. 46 However, the statutory
construction of title 5 of the United States Code, Section 552(c) and the
legislative intent to provide access to as much government information
as possible seem incompatible with a grant of judicial discretion.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The circuit court in Epstein made a solid contribution to the area
of the law concerning the discovery of state secrets. It did so by
outlining specific criteria, as to the duration of the initial classification,
the type of filing system employed, and the attitude of the withholding
agency, to be used by the courts in adjudging the propriety of executive
42. 421 F.2d at 933 (1970).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (c) (Supp. V, 1970) provides: "This section does not authorize
withholding. . . except as specifically stated in this section."
44. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (3) (Supp. V, 1970).
45. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., v. Veterans Administration, 301
F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); this case is criticized in Comment, Freedom of
Information, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS L. REv. 121 (1970). Comment, Administrative
Law-The Freedom of Information Act, 44 TUL. L. REv. 800 (1970).
46. United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 41 (1959); Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328-329, 331 (1944).
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classifications and by leaving the door open to future in camera review
in such proceedings. It should also be noted that the government had an
unusually favorable case since the classification involved the interests
of another nation. It is to be hoped that agencies and courts which are
involved in future cases concerning state secrets will continue in the
same vein as the Epstein court. It is to be hoped that all parties who
have occasion to deal with the Act, in any manner, will do so in the
spirit in which it was enacted:
The public business is the public's business. The people have the
right to know. Freedom of Information about public records and
proceedings is their just heritage . . These rights must be raised
to the7 highest sanction . . . The First Amendment points the
way.
JOHN H. WARREN I1l

47. H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW, 132.
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